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Abstract
This paper examines the potential applicability of an area banding approach in those
situations where real estate data and other resources are scare. The purpose is to
investigate the efficacy of property tax banding with respect to transitional countries,
and to test this, a number of municipalities in Kosovo are used. The banding exercise
is based on the actual floor area of the property. This will illustrate the potential
application of banding properties within ‘area bands’ as opposed to providing single
point estimates of value. The paper also addresses important research questions that
may have significant implications in the design of property tax systems within both
transitional and developing countries.
Property tax is often considered as an ideal local tax given that real property, as the
tax base, is immovable and hence a clearly defined source of potential revenue (Bird
and Slack, 2002). Additional advantages include the stability of the revenue stream,
its visibility in political terms, and its economic efficiency (Musgrave, 1983; Bird,
1993; Bird and Slack, 2002; and Trasberg, 2004). Real property assets represent a
reserve of wealth whose transfer price can be correlated to the level of services often
provided by local government. Fischel (2001) has argued that the property tax (in the
United States) is like a benefit tax because the taxes approximate to the benefits
received from local services. The property tax is considered an efficient tax as it
promotes efficient local decision-making. However, the tax is not a panacea for a
fiscally strapped local government as it represents one of the most difficult taxes to
implement and maintain (Bird and Wallich, 1994). It is a resource-intensive tax as it
requires technical skill in determining and maintaining the assessed values; collection
and updating of property data; identifying taxpayers, collection, and enforcement
(Bahl and Linn, 1992; Kelly, 1994; and Szalai and Tassonyi, 2000). It is argued for
ad valorem based property tax systems it is important to have relatively mature and
transparent property markets (Bryson, Cornia, and Wheeler, 2004; and Trasberg,
2004). The level of market maturity and how that translates into assisting the
development of a value based property tax is an interesting research question. Market
maturity is not defined in the literature but Keogh and D’Arcy (1994) suggest that it
is simply not just a matter of the passage of time, but relates more to economic and
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political maturity. What is clear, however, is that the property market must be
functioning at a level in which property is being traded in an environment that is open
and transparent. Linked to this is the availability of market information and transaction
evidence that can be objectively used in determining property values. It could be
argued that many transitional countries are at various stages of market maturity
particularly when one considers openness, reliability of property information, certainty
of title, and ownership and financing options.
It must be recognized that the real estate markets in many of the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) tend to be highly imperfect. They are generally
characterized by the lack of quality data on transactions, high transfer taxes that result
in under-declared values, absence of suitably qualified appraisers, and often limited
administrative structures to implement and manage real estate based taxes (Paugam,
1999). Notwithstanding these constraints, the property tax has been identified by many
transitional countries as an important fiscal resource for local government (McCluskey,
Almy, and Rohlickova, 1998; Tiits and Tomson, 1999; Malme and Youngman, 2001;
and Szalai and Tassonyi, 2004). Given these constraints, it is important to recognize
that one real property attribute that tends to be objectively collected in most, if not
all, transitional countries is the size, or floor area of the property. This has led to area-
based property tax systems being introduced in recognition of the need to tax real
property within local authority areas as a means to raise finance to meet infrastructural
and other locally-based expenditures. Exhibit 1 illustrates the predominance of area-
based property taxes levied on both land and buildings in a number of transitional
countries. While ‘value’ bases are used in several countries, these can be considered
to be more normative or prescribed values as opposed to market determined.
Many of the countries within the CEE region are attempting to redress decades of
low investment in infrastructure, low levels of economic growth, and the need to
provide sub-national government with the revenue to support these. An expanded
reliance on the area-based property tax is seen as a more feasible and realistic option
to the more traditional value-based property tax (Zorn, Tesche, and Cornia, 1999).
The area based system as used has a number of advantages. Firstly, it is relatively
easy for taxpayers to understand as it is based on the amount of space occupied (Zorn,
Tesche, and Cornia, 1999). Secondly, it is cheaper to administer than value-based
assessments given the requirement of the latter to regularly revalue to capture value
movements (Almy, 2002). Thirdly, administrations have some familiarity with area-
based approaches (McCluskey, Almy, and Rochlickova, 1998). Fourthly, data
requirements associated with an area-based tax are less than those associated with
traditional measures of valuation. Fifthly, trained assessors/valuers are not required.
And finally, self-appraisal or self-reporting of information is more easily accomplished
(Zorn, Tesche, and Cornia, 1999). Notwithstanding these perceived advantages, the
area-based system has a number of significant disadvantages. Firstly, it cannot
adequately capture the value of amenities to the same extent that a system based on
market values can (Bryson and Cornia, 2000). Secondly, there is also the lack of
equity associated with non-value approaches, with properties of similar size being
assessed at the same rate irrespective of locational differences (Bryson, Cornia, and
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Exhibit 1









Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Bulgaria  











Russian Federation  
Serbia and Montenegro  
Slovak Republic  
Slovenia  
Ukraine  
Totals 11 13 11
Note:
a Cadastral, inventory, decree value.
Wheeler, 2004). If this is viewed from the perspective of fairness, the literature shows
that there is a tighter relationship between the value of properties and services
consumed than between the size of properties and services used. If fairness is
perceived in such a way that similarly situated groups should bear similar burdens,
while differing groups should bear differing burdens, then tax levied on the basis of
floor space is patently unfair, as larger properties are not necessarily more valuable
(Balas and Kovacs, 1999). Finally, while less data intensive than an ad valorem
system, the area-based approach still requires detailed information on the size of land
and buildings, which requires certain skills in terms of referencing and measuring all
types of buildings and structures.
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Given the lack of a mature property market in many CEE countries, a realistic option
for a real estate tax has been to use the size of the property. As a practical matter,
the property tax need not be market based. There are examples where property taxes
are based on a flat rate per parcel with adjustments for size, location, use, and quality
(see the Arnona in Israel, Darin, 1999; and Portnov, McCluskey, and Deddis, 2001);
while some property taxes are area-based, either with or without adjustment for
location, use, and other factors (Mikesell, Dalehite, and Zorn, 2005).
If one accepts a priori that the most efficient and sophisticated property tax system is
one based on values, then where do alternative approaches fit in? Not every transitional
country has the resources and necessary administrative skills to implement a fully
fledged ad valorem system. We argue in this paper that an area-based property tax is
a useful interim approach that would allow for incremental development towards an
ad valorem tax. We provide empirical analysis to illustrate how a simplistic area
system based on bands could be designed utilizing data drawn from Kosovo.
This paper is divided into five sections. Section one provides the contextual
background to the research in terms of the potential applicability of area-based
property taxes. Section two describes the research methodology and data in relation
to developing the banding approach and adjusting for property location. Section three
investigates the banding of floor area under different scenarios. Section four integrates
into the banding a location adjustment coefficient. The final section provides a number
of concluding comments.
Research Methodology and Data
The concept of banding represents a somewhat simplistic but innovative approach to
developing a property tax based around quantitative variables such as real estate value
or floor area. Value-based banding has been used in Great Britain since 1993 for the
taxation of residential property (Kenway and Palmer, 1999; and Davis, Lim, and
McCluskey, 2004). Examples of size-based banding is used in a number of developing
countries including Laos (Visounnalath, Stevenson, and Burns, 2002), Sierra Leone
(McCluskey and Franzsen, 2005), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(McCluskey and Franzsen, 2005). The methodology underpinning a floor area banding
system relies upon the concept of dividing properties into different bands according
to their floor area for the purposes of determining a property tax bill. The main
characteristics of the floor area bands would be that there would be a single bill for
each household and that the level of taxation would be based on the area of the house.
The resulting tax is levied on the house, not on the constituent individuals of the
household. In principal, therefore, equally sized households occupying similarly areas
in different parts of the country pay comparable local taxes, although in practice it is
likely that there will be some variation across local authorities depending on the extent
to which municipalities spending deviates from the target set by central government.
Location-adjusted floor area bands, on the other hand, recognize the value of location
within assessed values and as such the research examines the effect of location by
utilizing location coefficients.
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Utilizing a number of municipalities in Kosovo, we have the opportunity to test
relatively simplistic property tax assessment methodologies and to appraise the
potential application of such approaches within transitional economies in general. In
respect of Kosovo, data on each taxable property has already been collected and
properties valued, allowing us to investigate the efficacy of utilizing a ‘simple’ banded
valuation approach based initially on the floor area of the residential property and
then to consider a location indexed floor area option. The latter was considered, as it
would allow national adoption of a common approach not possible in the current
system of ad hoc zoning using monetary units, retaining an element of locational
adjustment while also retaining the essential simplicity of banding on floor area.
Finally, in determining the acceptability of the various systems to the taxpayers,
comparison of the alternative approach in terms of the extent of incidence change at
the individual property level are also undertaken.
A revenue neutral position has also been adopted throughout the analysis and is
limited to only residential property. Therefore, each scenario redistributes the total
revenue raised by the residential property in the municipalities under the current
system. In determining the acceptability of the various scenarios to the taxpayers,
comparison of the alternative approaches in terms of the extent of incidence change
at the individual property level is also undertaken.
The data for this research has been drawn from three municipalities within Kosovo1
(Lipjan, Ferizaj, and Kacanik) where the total number of properties used as the sample
is 30,123. Exhibit 2 illustrates the location of the municipalities within the country.
In November 2001, a pilot property tax program was undertaken in Kosovo, which
resulted in the institution of the property tax in twenty-seven of the thirty
municipalities. The legislation that established the property tax as an institution of
municipal finance in Kosovo was Regulation 2003/29 Taxes on Immovable Property
in Kosovo. The basis of the property tax was market value promulgated on the size,
use, and location of the property (Powers, 2004). The effect of location was captured
by delineating value zones that were directly related to the accessibility of services.
The principal town or city of each municipality was designated as the area of highest
value. In some municipalities, one or more principal streets were selected as the
highest value locations. In Kosovo, the farther one is located from the central town
or city, the poorer the quality of roads, the greater the distance from schools, the less
the availability of publicly supplied water and other municipal services. Also, in the
more remote villages, buildings tend to be constructed of lower quality (‘‘softer,’’ in
Kosovo tradition) materials. For the purpose of establishing a market value, each
municipality was divided into four valuation zones. The taxable value is simply the
floor area of the property multiplied by its zone value (in euros/m2). The tax payable
is determined by applying the tax rate1 of 0.10% for residential properties in Ferizaj
and Kacanik and 0.12% for Lipjan. This facilitates the calculation of a bill for each
property, and the summation of the bills generates the total revenue, which is then
used to draw comparisons with the other floor area-based banding approaches.
Exhibit 3 shows for each municipality the number of dwellings (apartments and
houses) and the type of residential properties by valuation zone as used in the analysis.
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Exhibit 2
Map of Kosovo
Note: In Kosovo, the lowest allowable rate for residential property is
0.05% and the highest allowable rate is 1.0%. The capital is Pristina; Pop-
ulation: 1.9 million (Estimated, 2002). Source: USAID Profile: Kosovo July
2005.
Clearly, single-family houses dominate the data, representing some 95% of all
dwellings. It can also be seen that there is geographical concentration, with nearly
86% (1,246 out of 1,442) of the apartments located in the town center and some 61%
(17,449 out of 28,681) of the houses in Zone 3.
Floor Area Banded Options
Under a traditional property value banding system, the concept is one of dividing
properties into different bands according to an estimate of their capital or rental value
for the purposes of determining a property tax bill. However, in this paper, the banding
exercise will not be based on ‘value’ but rather on the actual floor area of the property.
The three key elements of banded system are the band widths, the multiplier per band,
and the multiplier ratio of lowest band to highest band. These elements can be
modified in different ways to examine whether a banding system can perform
adequately in terms of progressivity, a key factor in assessing the fairness of a tax.
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Exhibit 3
Distribution of Property by Municipality and Type
Municipality Zone
No. of Prop
Flat (Banesa) Euros /m2
No. of Prop
Houses (Shtëpi) Total Prop Euros /m2
Ferizaj 1 650 450 378 1,028 400
2 115 400 787 902 300
3 49 325 6,888 6,937 250
4 — — 5,815 5,815 200
Total 814 13,868 14,682
Kacanik 1 271 300 488 759 300
2 — 250 1,250 1,250 —
3 — 150 3,311 3,311 —
4 — 100 501 501 —
Total 271 5,550 5,821
Lipjan 1 325 350 116 441 350
2 11 300 1,011 1,022 300
3 21 200 7,250 7,271 200
4 — 150 886 886 150
Total 357 9,263 9,620
Total 1,442 (4.8%) 28,681 (95.2%) 30,123 (100%)
Exhibit 4
Multipliers under the Three Banding Options
Bands 3–1 Ratio 5–1 Ratio 7–1 Ratio
1 0.500 0.500 0.500
2 0.667 0.667 0.667
3 0.833 0.833 0.833
4 1.000 1.000 1.000
5 1.125 1.375 1.625
6 1.250 1.750 2.250
7 1.375 2.125 2.875
8 1.500 2.500 3.500
This element is of particular importance as any change in tax basis is likely to have
a considerable redistributive effect. Properties for all three municipalities are grouped
into different ranges of bands by floor area. This research adopts an eight-band
structure as previously used in Great Britain. Analysis was conducted on a range of
ratios including the ratios 3:1, 5:1, and 7:1, as these cover the low, medium, and high
range and therefore give a good indication of the effect of altering the ratio.
Exhibit 4 shows under the three banding options, the multiplier that is used to
determine the tax bill (note that Band 4 is the reference band). In order to work out
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Exhibit 5














1  20 1,572 5.2 11.45 9.35 7.90
2 21–40 2,784 9.2 15.27 12.47 10.54
3 41–60 5,161 17.1 19.09 15.59 13.17
4 61–80 6,104 20.3 22.91 18.71 15.81
5 81–110 6,107 20.3 25.77 25.72 25.69
6 111–150 4,915 16.3 28.63 32.74 35.57
7 151–190 1,998 6.6 31.49 39.75 45.45
8  190 1,482 4.9 34.36 46.77 55.33
Total 30,123 100
the tax bill, it is first necessary to establish a multiplier for each band. The remaining
multipliers between Bands 1 and 4 were arrived at by calculating equal arithmetic
steps and assigning these values to Bands 2 and 3, respectively. In order to calculate
the multipliers for Bands 5 to 8, it was first necessary to calculate Band 8, which is
calculated according to the relevant ratio employed. The next stage in assessing the
bills is common to all of the scenarios requiring a calculation of the number of Band
4 equivalents that lie in each band. This is worked out by multiplying the number of
properties in each band by the multiplier for each band. The number of Band 4
equivalents in each band is then totaled to give the total number of Band 4 equivalent
properties in the study area. This allows us to divide the total billable amount by the
total number of Band 4 equivalent properties to arrive at the Band 4 tax bill. Tax bills
for the other bands are then allocated by multiplying the Band 4 bill by the relevant
multiplier for each band.
To arrive at band change points, the average floor area in the data set was calculated.
On balance of methodological consistency and performance in initial testing, the
median was selected as the most appropriate measure of the ‘‘average’’ area for the
purposes of the research. The median (80m2) is thus inserted as the top limit for Band
4. The top of Band 1 (20m2) was calculated as the five percentile figure (the floor
area below which 5% of the properties lie). This allowed the change points for Bands
1–4 to be calculated as equal arithmetic steps. In order to calculate the change points
for Bands 5–8, a similar exercise was undertaken, with the highest Band 8 (190m2)
threshold representing the ninety-five percentile (the floor area above which 5% of
the properties lie). With the figure for the top of Bands 5 and the 8 threshold, it was
then possible to calculate the intervening change points as equal arithmetic steps. For
both the five percentile and ninety-five percentile, some minor rounding was carried
out to bring the band change points to an acceptable round number. Exhibit 5 shows
the area bands structure and the number of properties in each band along with the
associated tax bills.
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Exhibit 6 shows the effect of moving to a banded system from the current discrete
value, along with the effect of increasing the ratio of the tax bill between the top and
bottom bands (i.e., from a 3:1 multiplier to 5:1 and 7:1). It can be seen that in
comparison with area banding, the current value-based system is in fact levying the
least tax from the smallest properties and the most tax from the largest properties.
The picture in the mid ranges is not so clear cut. What can clearly be seen is that as
the banding ratio increases, banding becomes increasingly progressive, raising less
from the smaller properties and more from the larger dwellings. Clearly, the pattern
of revenue raising is fairly consistent across all four options, remarkably so for
properties falling into Band 6. Given that we have assessed values for each property,
we can directly compare the performance of the area approach against the value
approach in terms of distribution and progressivity. The research results can lead to
the assertion that in the absence of assessed values, the use of floor area is a good
proxy upon which to base the property tax.
The use of floor area alone produces a fairly robust distribution of tax bills across the
various scenarios. In order to refine the approach, we need to integrate a locational
value into the methodology in order to capture location influences. Such locational
factors would include proximity to city center and associated accessibilities to
services, which would result in a significant positive adjustment. Equally more remote
locations are likely to have a negative adjustment.
Location-Adjusted Floor Area Banding
For this analysis, the floor area of the properties is adjusted according to which value
zone (based on the current system) they are located within. Rather than the monetary
adjustment currently used, which is different in each municipality, a common system
has been devised by the application of an adjustment coefficient. The adjusted floor
areas are therefore calculated by multiplying the floor area by the location adjustment
coefficient, being indexed up or down to reflect the location, creating a new indexed
floor area attribute. These are then banded using the same approach adopted earlier.
As Zone 3 has the largest number of properties (58.2%), this is adopted as the base
zone. In determining the location coefficient to be applied to each valuation zone,
available sales were analyzed and compared to valuation Zone 3. However, sales data
across the two main property types were extremely limited. If more data were
available, the location coefficients could have been refined more accurately. Exhibit
7 shows properties located in valuation Zone 1 were on average 2.5 times more
valuable than Zone 3.
Exhibit 8 shows the bands, number, and percentage of properties per band and the
tax bills according to the various ratios. Banding at low ratio (3:1) has the effect of
taking more tax from the lower value properties and less tax from the higher valued
dwellings, by virtue of a higher minimum tax (11.63 euros) bill and a lower maximum
bill (34.90 euros). At the higher 5:1 and 7:1 ratios, banding on floor area has the
effect of pushing more of the tax take above the median value and onto the larger
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Exhibit 7
Distributions of Properties Adjusted by Location Coefficient
Valuation Zone No. of Properties % Properties Location Coefficient
1 2,228 7.4 2.50
2 3,174 10.5 1.50
3 17,519 58.2 1.00
4 7,202 23.9 0.50
Total 30,123 100.0
Exhibit 8





Properties % Properties 3:1 Tax Bill 5:1 Tax Bill 7:1 Tax Bill
1  20 2,372 7.9 11.63 9.37 7.84
2 21–40 3,731 12.4 15.51 12.49 10.45
3 41–60 5,059 16.8 19.39 15.61 13.07
4 61–80 5,306 17.6 23.27 18.74 15.68
5 81–110 4,814 16.0 26.18 25.76 25.48
6 111–150 4,242 14.1 29.09 32.79 35.28
7 151–190 2,126 7.1 32.00 39.81 45.08
8  190 2,473 8.2 34.90 46.84 54.88
Total 30,123 100
Discrete Bill 3:1 Tax Bill 5:1 Tax Bill 7:1 Tax Bill
Mean 23.60 23.60 23.60 23.60
Median 20.00 23.27 18.74 15.68
Std. Dev. 16.29 6.57 11.03 14.26
Coeff. of Var. 69% 28% 47% 60%
Minimum 0.20 11.63 9.37 7.84
Maximum 385.20 34.90 46.84 54.88
spread out and pushed upwards onto larger properties, if not necessarily the largest
(due to the capping effect inherent with banding). As the ratio increases, the range of
tax bills increases, with a corresponding decrease in the median tax bill paid. Indeed,
increasing the ratio would have the effect of making the tax increasingly more
progressive. In addition to the wide spread between the minimum and maximum bill
(with the lowest bills being 0.20 euros to the highest bills of 385.20 euros), statistical
measures such as standard deviation and coefficient of variation show a high level of
dispersion in tax bills under the current discrete system (see Exhibit 8).
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Exhibit 9
Band Change from Floor Area Band to Indexed Floor Area Band










1 band move 4,464 14.8
2 band move 4,937 16.4
3 band move 1,917 6.4
4 band move 44 0.1
No change 18,761 62.3
Total 30,123 100.0
When the results for the two approaches (area and location adjusted area) are directly
compared, it appears that there is a great deal of similarity of performance between
the two systems at this level of analysis. Both systems generate very similar bill
structures and distribute the tax burden in a similar fashion. Certain properties may
indeed move from one band to another, which would result in a difference on an
individual basis. For example, a small property that is centrally located may move
from a lower band (based on floor area alone) to a higher band (when location is
accounted for). The opposite may well occur for a larger property in a peripheral
location. However, as Exhibit 9 demonstrates, over 60% of properties would remain
in the same band under either banding system. Approximately 15% of the properties
would see a one band change with a further 16% experiencing a two band change. A
small proportion of approximately 6.4% of properties will experience a three band
move or greater.
Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper was to consider the efficacy of a robust system of
‘valuation banding’ based on the floor area of residential property as an alternative
approach to individual discrete valuations. In many transitional countries, evidence of
open market property transactions is limited and often of suspect quality, whereas,
data on the floor area of property is generally widely available and more accurate.
The introduction of value-based ad valorem property tax systems can be fraught with
difficulty, particularly where individual discrete valuations are required for each
taxable property. The underpinning rationale adopted in this paper recognizes the need
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for transitional countries to maximize their limited resources and utilize data that are
more readily available to develop a valuation-based property tax system. The size of
a taxable property, whether it be land and or a building, is a useful starting point in
developing an initial property tax. While we accept the positive advantages in having
an ad valorem property tax, such as greater fairness and equity, often the financial,
economic, and political environment is not sufficiently developed to introduce such a
tax. It is considered that a banded approach, if designed to reflect both the perceived
structure of the property values and the cultural and social expectations of the
taxpayers, in terms of the number of bands, size of bands, and tax structure can
overcome those technical and administrative valuation-based issues typically found in
most transitional countries. Kosovo has provided us with an opportunity to compare
the current value-based property tax with one derived from using the floor area of
each property. This has allowed for the comparison of a value-based approach with
one based first on floor area and then by floor area adjusted for location.
The research considered as a first stage the banding of properties based on the raw
floor area of property; the second stage was to investigate location indexed floor areas.
The location-adjusted area based system at the 7:1 ratio produced the lowest median
bill of any of the options, the lowest minimum bill, and the highest maximum bill of
the banding options and performed best against the current system in progressive
revenue raising terms. In these terms, it would appear that it is the best performer of
the banding options and most likely to gain acceptance in practice. It also
demonstrates an inherent feature of banding (i.e., the removal of uncollectible small
tax bills and also limiting the top end of liabilities), which might otherwise serve as
a disincentive to invest in adequately sized accommodation for the needs of the
populace, thereby lessening the risk that a tax which seeks to raise revenue for public
services may lead to overcrowding and other associated social ills.
The result of this analysis indicates that a banded floor area approach provides a
reasonable and cost-effective option where the necessary professional valuation skills
and property transaction data are limited. The research demonstrates that a simplified
system based on banded floor area can achieve a distribution of values and tax bills
broadly similar to that of a discrete value-based system. The necessity of having
simple, cost-effective solutions to the ad valorem problem for transitional countries
cannot be overestimated given their scarcity of resources. Placing residential properties
into one of several area bands is a relatively inexpensive and efficient procedure to
produce assessed values on which to base a source for local authority revenue. The
use of private sector valuers in co-operation with government valuers can speed up
the process and reduces the cost with minimal loss of accuracy. In this way banding
could prove to be a valuable tool in effectively harnessing local revenue raising
capacity in transitional economies and thereby producing a sustainable source of
revenue to enable local government to effectively and efficiently fulfill their remit.
Endnote
1. Kosovo previously existed as a semi-autonomous province of the former Republic of
Yugoslavia where some 90% of the population were Albanian speaking Kosovars. The
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imposition of Serbian rule in Kosovo in 1990 began a period of unrest and ultimately war,
which ended in 1999. On June 10, 1999, the United Nations Security Council authorized
the Secretary-General to establish an interim civilian administration in Kosovo, led by the
United Nations, under which the people of Kosovo could progressively enjoy substantial
autonomy (Powers, 2004).
References
Almy, R. A Survey of Property Tax Systems in Europe. Prepared for the Department of Taxes
and Customs, Ministry of Finance, Republic of Slovenia, 2002.
Bahl, R.W. and J.F. Linn. Urban Public Finance in Developing Countries. Washington, D.C.:
World Bank, 1992.
Balas, G. and R. Kovacs. Potential for the Introduction of a Value Based Property Tax in
Hungary. Journal of Property Tax Assessment & Administration, 1999, 4:2, 53–84.
Bird, R.M. Threading the Fiscal Labyrinth: Some Issues in Fiscal Decentralization. National
Tax Journal, 1993, 46, 207–27.
Bird, R.M. and E. Slack. Land and Property Taxation Around the World: A Review. Journal
of Property Tax Assessment and Administration, 2002, 7:3, 31–80.
Bird, R.M. and C. Wallich. Local Finance and Economic Reform in Eastern Europe.
Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 1994, 12, 263–76.
Bryson, P. and G. Cornia. Fiscal Decentralisation in Economic Transformation: The Czech and
Sloviak Cases. Europe-Asia Studies, 2000, 52:3, 507–22.
Bryson, P.J., G.C. Cornia, and G.E. Wheeler. Fiscal Decentralization in the Czech and Slovak
Republics: A Comparative Study of Moral Hazard. Government and Planning C: Government
and Policy, 2004, 22, 103–13.
Davis, P., L.C. Lim, and W.J. McCluskey. Residential Property Taxation: A Capital Value
Banding Approach. Journal of Property Tax Assessment and Administration, 2004, 1:3, 51–64.
Darin, D. A Politician’s Appraisal of Property Taxation: Israel’s Experience with Arnona.
Research paper, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA, 1999.
Fischel, W.A. Homevoters, Municipal Corporate Governance and the Benefit View of the
Property Tax. National Tax Journal, 2001, 54:1, 157–73.
Kelly, R. Implementing Property Tax Reform in Transitional Countries: the Experience of
Albania and Poland. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 1994, 12, 319–31.
Kenway, P. and G. Palmer. Council Tax: The Case For Reform. London: New Policy Institute,
1999.
Keogh, G. and E. D’Arcy. Market Maturity and Property Market Behaviour: A European
Comparison of Mature and Emergent Markets. Journal of Property Research, 1994, 11:3, 215–
35.
Malme, J.H. and J.M. Youngman. Introduction. In J.H. Malme and J.M. Youngman (Eds.), The
Development of Property Taxation in Economies in Transition, Case Studies from Central and
Eastern Europe. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2001.
McCluskey, W.J., R. Almy, and A. Rohlickova. The Development of Property Taxation in the
New Democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. Property Management, 1998, 16:3, 145–59.
McCluskey, W.J. and R.C.D. Franzsen. An Exploratory Overview of Property Taxation in the
Commonwealth of Nations, Working Paper (WP05RF1a), Lincoln Institute of Land Policy,
Cambridge, MA, 2005.
Mikesell, J., E. Dalehite, and K. Zorn. Variation in Property Tax Abatement Programs Among
States. Economic Development Quarterly, 2005, May, XIX.
Musgrave, R. Who Should Tax, Where and What? In C. McClure (Ed.), Tax Assignment in
Federal Countries. National Bureau of Economic Research, Princeton University Press, New
Jersey, 97–122, 1983.
Area-Based Banding for Property Tax Assessment in Transitional Countries 215
Paugam, A. Reform Toward an Ad Valorem Property Tax: Fiscal and Non-fiscal Benefits in
Transition Economies. Journal of Property Tax Assessment and Administration, 1999, 4:2, 3–
26.
Portnov, B.A., W.J. McCluskey, and G.W. Deddis. Property Taxation in Israel: A Non and Ad
Valorem Approach. Land Use Policy, 2001, 18, 315–64.
Powers, S. Property Tax Implementation in Kosovo. Journal of Property Tax Assessment &
Administration, 2004, 1:2, 45–55.
Szalai, A. and A. Tassonyi. Value Based Property Taxation: Options for Hungary. Toronto:
Canadian Urban Institute, 2000.
Trasberg, V. Property and Land Taxation in the Baltic States. Journal of Property Tax
Assessment and Administration, 2004, 1:2, 31–43.
Tiits, T. and A. Tomson. Land Value Taxation in Estonia. In W.J. McCluskey (Ed.), Property
Tax: An International Comparative Review. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company, 375–
84, 1999.
Visounnalath, O., R. Stevenson, and T. Burns, Lao People’s Democratic Republic: A Practical
Review of Land and Property Valuation in the Context of Land Administration. Journal of
Property Tax Assessment and Administration, 2002, 7:3, 3–17.
Zorn, C.K., J. Tesche, and G. Cornia. The Potential for a Property Tax in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Working Paper, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, Cambridge, MA, 1999.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
